The Japanese delegation was divided. Japanese naval doctrine required maintaining a fleet 70% the size of the United States, which was considered the minimum necessary to defeat the United States in a subsequent war. The Japanese envisioned two separate battles, first with the U.S. Pacific Fleet and then with the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. It was calculated that a ratio of 7:5 in the first battle would create a victory advantage large enough to be able to win the next battle, and therefore a ratio of 5:3 or 60% was unacceptable. Nevertheless, the director of the delegation, Katō Tomosaburō, preferred to accept the latter at the prospect of an arms race with the United States, because the relative industrial strength of the two nations would make Japan lose such an arms race and possibly suffer an economic crisis. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Japanese had only 55% of the capital and 18% of the GDP, which the Americans did. [Citation needed] He overlooked, like other German politicians, that Britain is obliged to respond not only to the danger of a purely naval rival, but also to the domination of Europe by any aggressive military power, especially if that power is capable of threatening the Netherlands and the canal ports. The Germans said the ratios would only be tonnage ratios and that Germany would increase its tonnage to the level of Britain`s tonnage in the various categories of warships. That afternoon the British Cabinet agreed to accept the proposed tonnage ratio, and that evening Ribbentrop was informed of the Cabinet`s intention. In the following weeks, the ongoing talks in London resolved many technical issues, most of which concerned exactly how to determine tonnage ratios for different categories of warships. Although it has been described as an “arms control conference,” the London Naval Treaty actually set limits beyond the current capability of some of the powers involved.
The U.S. Senate approved the treaty in July 1930 against the objections of key naval officers who feared that naval restrictions would impede America`s ability to defend its control over the Philippine islands. Then the United States launched a shipbuilding program to compensate for the difference between its existing tonnage of cruisers and what was allocated to it under the treaty. This building eventually helped alleviate the unemployment caused by the Great Depression. In recent days, representatives of the German Government and Her Majesty`s Government have held talks in the United Kingdom, the main objective of which was to pave the way for the holding of a general conference on naval arms control. I am now very pleased to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom has formally accepted the proposal of the German Government discussed during these talks that the future strength of the German Navy should be 35:100 in relation to the total strength of the fleet of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Her Majesty`s Government of the United Kingdom considers this proposal to be a contribution of the utmost importance to the cause of the future limitation of naval forces. They also consider that the agreement they have just concluded with the German Government, which they now regard as a permanent and definitive agreement between the two governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on the restriction of maritime transport between all the maritime powers of the world. “Marshal Goering`s threat that Germany could constitute up to 100% of the British fleet under certain circumstances, probably after the end of the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935, is clearly bluff[ emphasis added]. Given the large differences in size between the two navies, this threat could only be perceived if the British construction remained stationary for a considerable period of years while the German tonnage was built on it.
That would not happen. Although Germany is undoubtedly able to reach the figure of 35% by 1942 if it so wishes, or even noticeably earlier, it seems unlikely (given its difficulties with raw materials, currencies and the need to give priority to its massive rearmament on land and in the air, and given our own major programme) that it will far exceed that number in the coming years. This is not to say that we do not have every interest in avoiding a denunciation of the Anglo-German agreement of 1935, which would create a current state of uncertainty about Germany`s intentions and the ultimate danger of an attempt at parity with our navy, which must be considered potentially dangerous, since Germany is credited with a naval capacity to build. which is little lower than ours. Indeed, the naval agreement with Her Majesty`s Government is so important that it is difficult to imagine that a general agreement between Britain and Germany, as General Goering believes he wants, would still be possible if the German government terminated the naval agreement. An assertion by the latter must in all likelihood appear to form part of such a general understanding. Naval experts from Britain and Germany assumed that the Kriegsmarine would not reach tonnage restrictions until 1942 at the earliest. This did not happen for several reasons, including design problems, insufficient shipbuilding space, a shortage of skilled workers, and insufficient resources for raw materials. Germany`s main priorities were the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht. The German Government, for its part, also considers that the agreement it has just concluded with Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom, which it considers to be a permanent and definitive agreement with effect from today between the two Governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on this issue between all the maritime Powers of the world.
The requirement for the Kriegsmarine to divide its quota of 35% tonnage by category of warship meant that the Germans were obliged to build a symmetrical shipbuilding programme for the “balanced fleet” that reflected the UK`s priorities. [25] Since Royal Navy leaders believed that the “balanced fleet” would be the easiest to defeat the German fleet and that a German guerrilla fleet would be the most dangerous, the agreement brought significant strategic advantages to the United Kingdom. [49] Especially since the Royal Navy did not build “pocket battleships,” Chatfield appreciated the end of armored shipbuilding. [49] In the 1920s, Hitler`s foreign policy thinking underwent a radical change. .